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1 Introduction
1. Pareto Nash Reply
2. Existence
3. Characterization of Pareto Nash Reply using Multicriteria Linear Pro-
gramming.
4. Supported Strategies
We observe the notions of Pareto Nash strategies and their relations to multi-
parametric linear programming has made repeated appearances the game theory
literature. . What we contribute . We feel that the theory of MOG has
significant potential to model several practical scenarios especially in the context
of networked communications. For examples we refer the reader to [1].
This paper is organised as follows.
2 Multi-Objective Games
In conventional game theoretic problems, it is usually assumed that the deci-
sion makers usually make their decisions based on a scalar payoff. But in many
practical problems in economics and engineering, decision makers usually deal
with multiple objectives or payoffs. In these problems, one needs to consider a
vector payoff function. The notion of vector payoffs was originally introduced
by Blackwell [2] and later by Contini [3]. A more rigorous model for zero-sum
games and games against nature was studied by Zeleny [12]. In [12], Zeleny
solves the multiple objective zero-sum game using multi-parametric criteria lin-
ear programming. In the preceding work by Contini, a non-zero-sum version of
the Multi-Objective Game (MOG) is introduced. A general version concerning
the n-person MOG in the non-cooperative setting is introduced in [4]. A further
extension to cooperative games and hybrid games is introduced by Zhao in [9].
Then notions of Pareto Nash strategies was reborn in the works by Zelikovsky
[5] where the authors provide algorithms to obtain the Pareto Nash Equilibria.
We observe the notions of Pareto Nash strategies and their relations to multi-
parametric linear programming has made repeated appearances the game theory
literature. . What we contribute . We feel that the theory of MOG has
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significant potential to model several practical scenarios especially in the context
of networked communications. For examples we refer the reader to [1].
This paper is organised as follows.
3 Mathematical Notation
In this section, we introduce the notations which we will use hereafter. We
follow the standard notions used in the text by Weibull [10]. We shall consider
finite games in normal form. Let I = {1, 2, · · · , n} be the set of players where
n ≥ 2. For each player i ∈ I, let Si be her finite set of pure strategies. The
pure strategies set of player i ∈ I is written as Si = e1i , e2i , · · · , e
mi
i , for some
mi ≥ 2. The vector s of pure strategies, s = (s1, s2, · · · , sn), where si is the pure
strategy of any player i, is called the pure strategy profile. The pure strategies
profiles live in in the cartesian product space S = ×iSi.
For any strategy profile s ∈ S and player i ∈ I, let πi(s) ∈ Rli represent
the li dimensional vector payoff function for player i when all the players play a
strategy profile s. The combined payoff function π : S → ×iRli is the collection
π(s) = (π1(s), π2(s), · · · , πn(s)).
A mixed strategy for player i is a probability distribution over her set Si of
pure strategies. Let xi denote the mixed strategy for player i. Thus xi lives in
the mi − 1 dimensional unit simplex ∆i. Where,




Since these a probability distributions over the pure strategies, vertices of ∆i
correspond the mixed strategies e1i = (1, 0, · · · , 0), e2i = (0, 1, · · · , 0), · · · , e
mi
i =






i . A mixed strategy profile is a vector x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn),
which lives in Θ = ×i∆i. Let C(xi) be the support of the vector xi. i.e
Ci = {h | xih > 0}.






i xisi . If player j strategy in the strategy profile x is replaced
by another strategy yj we denote the replaced profile by (yj , x−j). Then the





It should be noted here that ui ∈ Rli . Each component function uki k ∈
{1, 2, · · · , li} is a multi-linear mapping that is linear in each vector component
xj ∈ ∆j . The collection of payoff vectors for each i ∈ I is called the combined
mixed strategy payoff function and is denoted by u(x) = (u1(x), u2(x), · · · , un(x).
3.1 Multiple Matrix Games
Since we consider the two player games (|I| = n = 2) in greater detail in this
work, we introduce the notion of Multiple Matrix Games (MMG) which is a nat-
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Notation Definition Name
x ≥ y xi ≥ yi i = 1, 2, .., l Weak component-wise order
x > y xi ≥ yi i = 1, 2, .., l and x 6= y Component-wise order
x y xi > yi i = 1, 2, .., l Strict component-wise order
Table 1: Table of Orders in Rl
ural extension to the Bi-Matrix Games in the single objective setting. The same
matrix notation has also been considered by [12]. Associated with each player
is a sequence of matrix payoff functions (A1, A2, · · · , Al1) and (B1, B2, · · · , Bl2)
(for player I and II respectively). We assume that player I is the row-player
and player II is column player. Let us suppose that player I chooses strategy
ξ ∈ ∆1 and player II chooses strategy η ∈ ∆2. Then the expected scalar payoff
with respect to the pth and qth objective of the MOG for player I and II is given
by ξTApη and ξTBqη respectively, where p ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l1} and q ∈ {1, 2, · · · , l2}.
4 Pareto Nash Equilibrium
As in the case of Single Objective Games, the notion of equilibrium can be
defined in terms of unfruitful deviation from the equilibrium strategies. In the
MOG setting, this can be interpreted as follows.
Deviations from the equilibrium strategies do not offer any gains to any of
the pay-off functions for any of the players.
In order to compare vector payoffs we introduce the notions of orders in Rl
in Table 1. These orders are commonly used in multi-criteria optimization liter-
ature. In order to rigorously define the Pareto Nash Equilibrium, we introduce
the notion of a Pareto Reply.
Definition The Pareto Reply of player i ∈ I for the strategy profile x−i of the
rest of the players is defined as that strategy xi ∈ ∆i such that the strategy
profile (xi, x−i) is pareto optimal with respect to the vector payoff function
ui(., x−i). Let us denote the Pareto Response correspondence as
βPi : ×k 6=i∆k → 2∆i .
i.e. suppose x−i is the strategy profile of all the players k 6= i then
βPi (x−i) = {xi ∈ ∆i | 6 ∃z ∈ ∆i such that ui(z, x−i) > ui(xi, x−i}
where > is the component-wise order defined in Table 1.
The combined pareto reply correspondence of the strategy profile x is then
given by βP (x) = (βP1 (x−1), β
P
2 (x−2), · · · , βPn (x−n)).
Definition A strategy profile x∗ = (x∗1, x
∗
2, · · · , x∗n) is called a Pareto Nash
Equilibrium for the MOG if x∗ ∈ βP (x∗). The set of all Pareto Nash Equilibria
is denoted by ΘPNE .
In other words a Pareto Equilibrium Strategy is a fixed point of the Pareto
Reply Correspondence. It should be mentioned here that the Kakutani Fixed
Point theorem cannot be invoked to prove the existence of such an equilibrium
here because the pareto replies do not necessarily form a convex set. For detailed
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reference on these fixed point problems we refer the reader to [6]. We note that
in the current game theoretic literature, there are several complicated proofs
for existence of equilibrium in various topological spaces. We however give an
alternative proof for the existence of the Pareto Nash which is solely motivated
from Nash’s original work and Pareto Optimality.
4.1 Pareto Dominating Replies
Nash in his seminal work on Non-Cooperative Games ([7], [8]) introduces the
notion of better responses which has motivated the study of several similar
dynamics in the literature [10]. However it should be mentioned that Nash used
the better response maps to prove the existence of a non-cooperative equilibrium.
In the same spirit we define the so called Pareto Dominating Reply. Let suppose
we can express the payoff vector as ui(x) = (u1i (x), u
2
i , · · · , u
li
i ). Choose an
arbitrarily small ε > 0.
Then let








i , x−i)− u
li












The Pareto Dominating Reply map DP : Θ→ Θ is defined as DP : x 7→ x′
x′ih =






∀h ∈ Si ∀i ∈ I
Theorem 4.1 The map DP : Θ→ Θ has a fixed point xf .
Proof The map DP is continuous and the Θ is a compact convex set. Then by
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem([6]) there exists a fixed point xf for DP in Θ.
Lemma 4.2 For any strategy profile x and ∀i ∈ I ∃p ∈ {1, 2, · · · , li} and
h ∈ C(xi) such that upi (ehi , x−i) ≤ u
p
i (x).
Proof Suppose there 6 ∃h ∈ C(xi) such that upi (ehi , x−i) ≤ u
p
i (x). Then for all
h ∈ C(xi) we have
upi (e
h
















⇒ upi (x) > u
p
i (x)
Which is not possible. Hence proved.
Theorem 4.3 x is the fixed point of DP if and only if it is a Pareto Nash
Equilibrium.
Proof We prove the first implication that if x is a fixed point then x is a Pareto
Nash Equilibrium.
If x is a fixed point then
xih =






∀h ∈ Si ∀i ∈ I
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By using Lemma 4.2 we know that ∃h ∈ C(xi) such that upi (ehi , x−i)leu
p
i (x).












i (x) = 0. Since c
k
i (x) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ Si, we have
cki (x) = 0 ∀k ∈ Si ∀i ∈ I.
Next we show that any i ∈ I cki (x) = 0 k ∈ Si ⇒ xi ∈ βPi (x−i). Since
this is true ∀i ∈ I ⇒ x is a Pareto Nash Equilibrium.
cki (x) = 0 ∀k ∈ Si
⇒6 ∃eki such that ui(eki , x−i) > ui(x)
⇒6 ∃z ∈ ∆i such that ui(z, x−i) > ui(x)(Since ∆i = Co(eki |k ∈ Si))
where Co(S) stands for the Convex Hull of the set S.
Next we prove the other implication. If x is Pareto Nash Equilibrium, then
x is a fixed point of DP .
Since x is a Pareto Nash Equilibrium, ∀i ∈ I, xi ∈ βPi (x−i).
⇒6 ∃z ∈ ∆i such that ui(z, x−i) > ui(x)
⇒ In particular 6 ∃h ∈ Si such that ui(ehi , x−i) > ui(x)
⇒ chi = 0 ∀h ∈ Si ∀i ∈ I
Therefore x is a fixed point of the DP .
We have shown that ΘPNE 6= ∅. We trust that this proof method would
inspire some dynamics to achieve the equilibria in the MOG setting. We next
characterize the equilibrium set ΘPNE .
5 Pareto Nash Reply, A Multi-criteria Linear
Programming problem
In this section we characterize the geometry of the Pareto Nash Reply set. To aid
us, we introduce some further notations. Throughout this section the notation
for the orders on vectors is consistent with that in Table 1. We first introduce
the incomplete.
5.1 Pareto Optimality in Games
Given a vector payoff function ui(x) = (u1i (x), u
2
i (x), · · · , u
li
i (x)) the decision





where the superscript P stands for Pareto maximization. Let us denote the
payoff space Ui(x−i) := {ui(xi, x−i)|xi ∈ ∆i}.
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Definition A feasible solution x̂i ∈ ∆i is called efficient or Pareto Optimal
for the profile x−i of the other players, if there is no other xi ∈ ∆i such that
ui(xi, x−i) > ui(x̂i, x−i). If x̂i is efficient, ui(x̂i, x−i) is called non-dominated
point in Ui. If x1i , x2i ∈ ∆i and ui(x1i , x−i) > ui(x2i , x−i) we say x1i dominates
x2i and ui(x
1
i , x−i) dominates ui(x
2
i , x−i). The set of all inefficients solutions is
denoted by XiE . The set of all non-dominated points is denoted by UiN .
Next we proceed to characterize the non-dominated set UiN for the problem
at hand. The objective function for (1) is indeed a linear objective in xi. Since
xi ∈ ∆i lives in a finite dimensional vector space, we can associate an objective
matrix Ui, which is a li×|Si| matrix. Ui will be a function of the strategy profile
x−i of the other players. But in a game setting we assume that this is know to




Definition Let xi ∈ XiE . If there is some λi ∈ Rli>0 such that xi ∈ XiE is
an optimal solution of max
xi∈∆i
λTi ui(xi, x−i) then xi is called a supported efficient
strategy and ui(xi, x−i) is called supported non-dominated payoff for player i.
The set of all supported efficient strategies and supported non-dominated payoffs
are denoted by XisE and UisN .
We next present a sequence of lemmas which aid in characterizing the effi-
cient strategies and non-dominated points. For detailed proofs we refer to the
reader to [11].
Lemma 5.1 XiE 6= ∅
Proof ∆i is a closed set. The payoff set for player i,Ui = {Uixi|xi ∈ ∆i} is
also thus a closed set (By continuity of the bounded linear operator). Hence
XiE 6= ∅
Lemma 5.2 XiE = XisE and UisN = UisN .
Proof ∆i is a convex set.
⇒ {Uixi|xi ∈ ∆i} is a convex set. ⇒ UisN = UisN . (Theorem 3.5 [11]).
Lemma 5.2 suggests that the Pareto reply can be solved by weighted sum
scalarization. For reference on this technique we suggest (Chapter 3 [11]). It
should be mentioned here that this exactly the approach used to develop algo-
rithms to obtain the Pareto Nash Equilibrium in [5]. However the algorithm
that their work suggest is only an existential arguement. It does not provide any
means to construct the weights for the scalarization. However for our problem,
we identify that there is more structure to construct these weights λi and obtain
a constructive algorithm to obtain the Pareto Nash Strategies. To justify our
algorithm we present some principles from the simplex methods of linear pro-
gramming. For a detailed reference on this topic we refer the reader to Chapter
2 of [13] and Chapters 7 and 8 of [11]. Next we present a series of lemmas that
help to characterize the geometry of the Pareto reply set. INcomplete
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Definition The weighted sum linear program corresponding to the pareto reply




And let us denote the set of solutions for λi ∈ Rli>0 as LP (λi).
From Lemma 5.2 we know that all the Pareto replies for player i can be
obtained from {LP (λi) ∀λi ∈ Rli>0}. Hence,
Lemma 5.3 ∪λi∈Rli i>0LP (λi) = β
P
i (x−i)
Lemma 5.4 The payoff space Ui(x−i) is supported by a finite set of hyper-
planes.
Proof ∆i is a convex compact set. If ui is a bounded function for every objec-
tive, then Ui(x−i) is a convex polytope. A convex polytope has a finite number
of faces and each face is supported by a hyperplane (Chapter 2 of [13]).
Lemma 5.5 dim(Ui(x−i)) = min(rank(Ui), |Si| − 1)
Proof Ui : ∆i → Rli is a linear transformation of the |Si| − 1 dimensional
simplex to Rli .
Theorem 5.6 There exists a finite set Λi = {λik ∈ Rli>0} such that ∪λi∈ΛiLP (λi) =
βPi (x−i)
Proof The existential proof is a direct implication from Lemma 5.4. We
provide a constructive proof using the method of multicriteria linear pro-
gramming. Algorithm 1 is an abstraction of the Algorithms 6.2 and 7.1 of [11].
By transversing through the connected efficient bases, we obtain the kissing
planes of the Ui(x−i). A detailed discussion on this algorithm we refer the
reader to Chapter 7 of [11]. The number of efficient pivots is finite and hence
Λi = L.
Algorithm 1 Compute Weights
List L = {}
Find a initial basic feasible solution.
Determine an initial efficient basis and corresponding weights λi1.
L ← L ∪ λi1
k ← 1
while Efficient Pivot 6= ∅ do
Perform Efficient Pivot operation.
Determine efficient basis and weights λik.
L ← L ∪ λik.
k ← k + 1
end while
Theorem 5.6 establishes through construction a finite set of weights which
give all the Pareto best replies of player i. At the Pareto Nash equilibrium each
player’s Pareto reply is thus supported by a finite weight vector set ΛPNEi .
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Theorem 5.7 At the Pareto Nash equilibrium every player solves finite se-
quence of single objective games.
Proof At the Pareto Nash equilibrium xPNE ∈ ΘPNE , xPNEi ∈ βPi (xPNE−i ).
⇒ xPNEi ∈ ∪λi∈ΛP NEi LP (λi) (Theorem 5.6).
Thus every player i plays a corresponding a finite sequence of single objective




This simple algorithmic interpretation of the Pareto Nash equilibria yields
insights on the structure of the convex polyhedron which acts as the decision
space for every player. The payoff space Ui(x−i) is a convex polyhedron with
the corner points being u(ehi , x−i), h ∈ Si. This suffices to characterize the
Pareto Nash Equilibrium set.
Structure of the Pareto Nash Equilibria
Lemma 5.8










i , x−i > 0
∀i ∀h ∈ Si}
Proof The convex polyhedron interpretation of U shows that the Pareto Nash
equilibria like Nash Equilibria can be characterized by unilateral deviations.
∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n}
{h ∈ Si| ∀q ∈ {1, 2, · · · , li} uqi (e
h
i , x−i) ≥ u
q
i (x) and
∃q ∈ {1, 2, · · · , li} uqi (e
h
i , x−i) > u
q
i (x)} = ∅
{h ∈ Si| ∃q ∈ {1, 2, · · · , li} uqi (e
h
i , x−i) < u
q
i (x) or
∃q ∈ {1, 2, · · · , li} uqi (e
h
i , x−i) ≤ u
q
i (x)} = Si
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